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The relationship between population changes and economic growth
has been debated since Malthus. Initially focusing on population
growth, the notion of demographic dividend has shifted the
attention to changes in age structures with an assumed window
of opportunity that opens when falling birth rates lead to a relatively
higher proportion of the working-age population. This has become
the dominant paradigm in the field of population and development,
and an advocacy tool for highlighting the benefits of family planning
and fertility decline. While this view acknowledges that the dividend
can only be realized if associated with investments in human capital,
its causal trigger is still seen in exogenous fertility decline. In
contrast, unified growth theory has established human capital as a
trigger of both demographic transition and economic growth. We
assess the relative importance of changing age structure and
increasing human capital for economic growth for a panel of 165
countries during the time period of 1980–2015. The results show a
clear dominance of improving education over age structure and give
evidence that the demographic dividend is driven by human capital.
Declining youth dependency ratios even show negative impacts on
income growth when combined with low education. Based on a
multidimensional understanding of demography that considers edu-
cation in addition to age, and with a view to the additional effects of
education on health and general resilience, we conclude that the
true demographic dividend is a human capital dividend. Global pop-
ulation policies should thus focus on strengthening the human re-
source base for sustainable development.
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The notion of a demographic dividend has recently receivedprominence in the discussions around international devel-
opment as a particular way of viewing the effects of demographic
changes on economic growth. The original concept is based on
the assumption that a decline in the proportion of young people,
as a consequence of reduced fertility in a high-fertility context,
will give a boost to economic growth if investments in education
and health services as well as economic policies conducive to
income growth are implemented. While international agencies
and foundations promoting family planning tend to emphasize
the role of low fertility (1), policy makers in Africa tend to
highlight the advantage of the human capital associated with a
youthful population (2).
This contradictory use of the term “demographic dividend”
further adds to an already complex discussion about the effects
of demographic trends on economic growth in the international
development community. The topic has been discussed at least
since Thomas Malthus published his 1798 essay on “The Prin-
ciple of Population” (3). The focus of the discussion on the role
of population change in economic consequences has moved from
an early focus on population growth to a focus on changing
population age structures (since the 1980s) to a focus on
changing age and educational attainment structures (since the
2000s). Here we revisit the discussions in the demographic and
economic research communities and provide empirical estimates
of such a possible demographic dividend on the basis of a
multidimensional demographic approach applied to a panel of
over 165 countries for the period 1980–2015.
Population and Economic Development
In reaction to a highly controversial debate over population
growth that ranged from horror about a “population bomb” (4)
to praising more people as the “ultimate resource” (5), the Na-
tional Research Council (NRC), through its authoritative 1986
report (6), assessed the global empirical evidence related to the
possible benefits of lower population growth, ranging from less
degradation of natural resources to effects on savings, innovation,
and per capita expenditure on schooling and health. It promi-
nently highlighted the importance of human capital for economic
growth and offered a differentiated overall assessment of the
effects of population growth by pointing at important condi-
tionalities. Our reassessment of the evidence 33 y after this report
confirms the importance of conditionality and, based on newly
available detailed data on educational attainment distributions by
age and sex, we can single out human capital formation as a key
strategy among a host of relevant government policies.
This differentiated conclusion of the NRC report came as a
disappointment to the proponents of family planning, who had
hoped for clearer evidence on the economic benefits of fertility
decline by itself. Such evidence seemed to regain importance
with a shifting of the focus from population growth to the
changes in age structure that are induced by declining fertility.
Such an approach builds on a tradition of the study of age
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structure effects which starts, to our knowledge, with the little-
known work of Günther (7) for Germany in 1931, claiming that
declining birth rates cause unemployment because of the asso-
ciated declines in consumer demand. The more prominent work
by Coale and Hoover (8) focusing on capital dilution through
many children also had an implicit focus on age structure. The
empirical work by Kelley and Schmidt (9, 10), Bloom and
Williamson (11), and other related studies estimated cross-country
growth regressions which explicitly included the ratio of the
working-age population over total population as one of the de-
terminants of economic growth. These studies tend to find sig-
nificant effects of an increasing share of the working-age
population on output per person, not only through the increasing
proportion of potentially productive individuals (also labeled
translation effect) but also through the productivity effect [mea-
sured by gross domestic product (GDP) per person of working
age], which would presumably result from higher aggregate
savings and more investments in infrastructure, as well as higher
female labor force participation rates.
It is worth noting that “working age” is an abstraction—typically
assuming that work only happens in the 15- to 65-y age range and
that everybody makes an equal contribution—derived from West-
ern welfare states and from a time when it was difficult to get actual
data on labor force participation and educational attainment, by
age and sex. With good national time series data on educational
attainment, by age and sex, available, there is no reason to further
uphold the highly problematic assumption that everybody of a
certain age is equally contributing to economic growth.
Recently, a set of global economic growth regression studies
has explicitly included human capital variables in addition to
indicators of age structure. While Bloom and Williamson (11)
do, in fact, include years of postprimary schooling of the adult
population in their first set of regressions (with a positive and
statistically significant effect on economic growth), they do not
include it in their final model, which results in the widely cited
finding that about a third of the economic growth of the Asian
tigers can be explained by age structure changes, with the role of
human capital not being discussed. Crespo Cuaresma and co-
workers (12, 13) provide a global assessment of the relative ef-
fects of age structure and human capital using the specification
by Benhabib and Spiegel (14, 15). They include the absolute level
of education as a factor facilitating technological innovation and
adoption (and thus affecting total factor productivity), in addi-
tion to the rate of change in the human capital of the labor force.
The empirical results in Crespo Cuaresma et al. (13) suggest
strong human capital effects on economic productivity but no
significant productivity effect of changing age structures. Only a
quantitatively small translation (accounting) effect of the age
structure remains, resulting from the fact that GDP per person is
sensitive to the number of children included in the denominator.
These results let the authors conclude that the demographic
dividend is in fact an education dividend.
Aside from the population research community, the impor-
tance of human capital for long-run economic growth has been
demonstrated during recent years within the framework of the
so-called Unified Growth Theory (16). While low technological
progress in the Malthusian phase of history implied that pop-
ulation growth induced pressure on economic growth, increasing
technological progress allowed for the continuous increase of
population and economic growth in the post-Malthusian phase.
The transition to the modern growth regime (on which our paper
focuses) was then initiated by increasing human capital triggering
the demographic transition that finally led to a negative relation
between economic growth and the rate of population growth. On
the supply side, this model assumes that increasing returns to
human capital accumulation, as caused by technological progress
(17), induce higher investment into the education of children and
a reduction in fertility, thereby initiating the onset of the de-
mographic transition. The mutual causation between education
and fertility decline has been empirically verified (e.g., for
Prussia in ref. 18, and for Ireland in ref. 19), and complementary
theories (20) stress the role of increasing life expectancy (that
boosted the returns to human capital further) and the importance
of formal schooling in the period after the Industrial Revolution.
The resulting positive feedback loop between technological
progress, human capital formation, fertility decline, and increasing
survival is the underlying mechanism that explains the modern
growth regime.
So far, most of the studies on the connection between demo-
graphic change and economic growth have focused on the role of
changes in age structure (as induced by the demographic transi-
tion), assigning the human capital component only a mediating
role. However, as the vast literature in economics shows, human
capital is the key driver to explain both the demographic transition
and economic growth. Our results strongly support this theoretical
literature, since we identify the compositional change of human
capital as the main correlate to explain economic growth.
Changing Age and Education Structures
While, sometimes, demographic change is narrowly viewed as
only referring to changing age structure, both common usage by
the public and authoritative scientific definitions have a broader
view that includes changes with respect to several demographic
dimensions. When media write about the changing demograph-
ics of America in the context of voting behavior, they refer to the
changing proportions of Hispanics, changing proportions in ur-
ban, semiurban, and rural areas, and changing education struc-
tures, among others. This is also in line with the definition of
demography by the International Union for the Scientific Study
of Population (IUSSP) as the scientific study of changing pop-
ulation size and structures, addressing multiple structures.* The
influential textbook Methods and Materials of Demography (21,
22) denotes as “demographic” to all characteristics of people
that are typically collected in a census. Following this broader
definition, we call changes in the education structure of pop-
ulations demographic in the same way as changes in the age
structure. Terminologically, a demographic dividend can thus
also be a dividend arising from changing education structures.
Which of these demographic structures is more important for
economic growth is a matter of empirical assessment rather than
ex ante assumptions.
Using tools of multidimensional population dynamics (23, 24),
the changing structures of educational attainment by age and sex
have recently been reconstructed for all countries in the world
back to 1950 and projected to the end of the century according to
different scenarios. Unlike other historical data on human cap-
ital (25), these human capital data are based on models that also
take into account that vital rates differ by level of education (26–
28). With most countries showing strong fertility and mortality
differentials by education, explicitly incorporating these addi-
tional sources of population heterogeneity also tends to change
the aggregate-level results (population size and age structure) in
addition to providing useful information about these additional
dimensions themselves (such as changing educational attainment
distributions).
Fig. 1 illustrates reconstructed education and age pyramids for
South Korea, a country that has featured prominently in the
discussions around the potential benefits of the demographic
dividend. The figure clearly indicates that basic education ex-
panded massively among young cohorts before economic growth
took off with double-digit rates in the late 1960s. These cohort-
specific educational attainment data also helped to unambigu-
ously demonstrate the effect of human capital on economic
growth, a link that had previously been blurred by the fact that
statistical signal was lost when using the mean years of schooling
*The IUSSP had, for many years, the following definition of demography prominently on
its website: “Demography is the scientific study of changing population size and struc-
tures.” It has recently been replaced by the even more general definition, “Demography
is the scientific study of human populations,” attributed to its past president
Peter McDonald.
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of the entire adult population as an indicator of human capital
rather than accounting for decisive differences by age cohorts (12).
Assessing the Interaction between Age Structure and
Education for Economic Growth
We adopt the theoretical framework put forward by Kelley and
Schmidt (10) and expand it to account for technology adoption
effects such as those proposed in Benhabib and Spiegel (14, 15) or
Lutz et al. (12). The production function of the economy is assumed
to be given by a Cobb−Douglas specification with Hicks-neutral
technical change. Output is produced by physical capital that
evolves based on the savings decisions of households and depreci-
ates over time, and by human capital determined by the composi-
tion of the population by age, education, and labor force
participation. Technological change, which increases the effi-
ciency of all factors of production, is, in turn, affected by the
level of human capital, as well as by the interaction between
human capital and the country’s technological “backwardness”
(the distance between the technology level of the country and
that of the global frontier).
Such a model predicts effects of age structure which are de-
termined by the prevailing level of human capital. In other
words, the effects of a given change in age structure on economic
growth depend on whether it takes place in a highly educated
context or in the framework of a largely illiterate society. From a
theoretical point of view, the effect of human capital on the
speed of income convergence implies that relatively poorer
economies benefit more from human capital accumulation than
richer ones, due to technology adoption effects, which speed up
the process of convergence to the technology frontier (14, 15).
The effects of age structure (as captured by the share of working-
age population) on economic growth depend on the stock of
human capital, with higher human capital stocks leading to larger
positive effects of increases in working-age population relative to
the total population.
The regression model resulting from the theoretical specifi-
cation used (SI Appendix) is given by
Δ ln
Yit
Nit
=φ1hit +φ2 ln
Yit−1
Nit−1
+φ3hit ln
Yit−1
Nit−1
+φ4 ln
Wit−1
Nit−1
+φ5hit ln
Wit−1
Nit−1
+φ6 ln
Lit−1
Wit−1
+ +φ7hit ln
Lit−1
Wit−1
+φ8Δ ln kit +φ9Δ lnLit +φ10Δ lnNit + «it, [1]
where Yit is total output in country i at time t, kit denotes physical
capital per worker, hit measures human capital, Nit is total pop-
ulation, Wit is working-age population, and Lit is the size of the
labor force. The error term, «it, is assumed to contain a fixed
country-specific component and a period component, as well as
an independent random component. We estimate the specifica-
tion put forward above making use of a panel dataset for over
165 countries spanning the period 1980–2015, divided into 5-y
subperiods. The GDP and capital stock data are sourced from
the Penn World Table 9.0 (29), while labor force, working-age
population, and total population figures are from The World
Bank’s World Development Indicators. Human capital is ap-
proximated making use of the share of persons attaining at least
completed junior secondary, i.e., postprimary education, employ-
ing the data from the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and
Global Human Capital. All of the variables which enter the
model in levels are measured in the initial year of the corre-
sponding 5-y period, and all specifications include both country
and period fixed effects to account for time-invariant character-
istics at the country level, as well as for global period shocks.
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Fig. 1. Republic of Korea age and education pyramids for 1955, 1975, 1995, and 2015.
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The first column in Table 1 presents the results of the esti-
mation of a simple regression model where the growth rate of
GDP per capita is explained by the growth of capital per worker,
the growth of the labor force, and the growth rate of population.
In this specification, only the growth rate of physical capital per
worker and (marginally) the growth rate of the labor force show
significant positive effects on economic growth. Expanding the
model to include labor force participation and the working-age
share, as well as the initial level of income per capita, we only
find additional significant effects on economic growth in the
form of conditional income convergence to country-specific
equilibria and human capital accumulation effects. The third
column of Table 1 presents the estimates obtained after adding
the interaction of human capital and initial income to the
specification to address potential technology adoption effects, as
in Benhabib and Spiegel (14, 15). The results of the estimation of
this model unveil significant technology adoption effects fueled
by education, with the returns in terms of increased economic
growth being larger for poorer economies. Finally, the last col-
umn in Table 1 presents the results from the full model, which
includes effects of age structure that are determined by the level
of human capital of the country. In this model, the role of age
structure changes in economic growth depends on whether these
happen in the context of high or low human capital stocks.
The effects of changes in the share of the working-age pop-
ulation by level of human capital which are implied by the esti-
mates of this model are depicted in Fig. 2. They indicate that
significant positive growth effects of increases in the share of
population in working age are only prevalent in countries where
a relatively large part of the population has achieved an educa-
tional attainment level beyond primary education. The effects of
expanding the working-age share that the model predicts for
countries with a very low proportion of persons with some sec-
ondary education are even negative.
The results obtained for the full sample concerning the role of
human capital as a determinant of the effect of age structure on
economic growth appear robust to different definitions of the
human capital variable, in terms of focusing both on narrower
age groups and on female and male education separately. The
conclusions also do not change when the model is estimated for
different subgroups of countries with a particular focus on those
that went through rapid fertility declines during the observation
period. The effect of education turns out to be even stronger
when the analysis is limited to the early demographic transition
countries where changing age structure would only have positive
effects on growth for relatively high levels of educational at-
tainment. A detailed discussion of these sensitivity analyses and
alterative specifications can be found in SI Appendix.
These empirical results confirm and expand the previous
findings in Crespo Cuaresma et al. (13) concerning the lack of an
Table 1. Regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth of capital per worker 0.673*** 0.559*** 0.534*** 0.476***
(8.92) (5.59) (5.58) (5.55)
Growth of labor force 0.436* 0.266 0.262 0.390
(1.76) (1.03) (1.05) (1.48)
Growth of population −0.0723 0.167 0.325 0.192
(−0.11) (0.31) (0.60) (0.34)
Log of Labor force/Working-age population −0.351 −0.240 −0.265
(−1.52) (−1.12) (−0.89)
Log of Working-age population/Total population 0.0813 −0.259 −1.361**
(0.27) (−0.78) (−2.95)
Postprimary education attainment 0.745* 4.474*** 9.560***
(1.96) (3.52) (4.86)
Initial income per capita −0.506*** −0.380*** −0.270**
(−5.38) (-3.36) (−2.24)
Postprimary education attainment* −0.351** −0.710***
Initial income per capita (−3.06) (−4.83)
Postprimary education attainment* 0.546
Log of Labor force/Working-age population (0.92)
Postprimary education attainment* 4.339***
Log of Working-age population/Total population (3.59)
Observations 835 778 778 778
Countries 167 166 166 166
R2 (within) 0.252 0.509 0.527 0.558
Adjusted R2 (within) 0.246 0.501 0.519 0.550
Estimates are based on specifications nested in Eq. 1. All models are based on a panel dataset with 5-y periods,
country fixed effects, and period fixed effects included in all models. T-test statistics are based on robust SEs in
parentheses; */**/*** stands for significance at the 10%/5%/1% level.
Fig. 2. Effect of working age share on GDP per capita growth by level of
education.
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independent effect of age structure on productivity and thus on
aggregate economic growth. Moreover, explicitly addressing the
interactions between the effect of changing age structure and
education levels reveals that, in the case of low shares of pop-
ulation having at least completed junior secondary education,
the effect can be negative. In other words, a population in which
the number of children declines and thus the proportion in
working age increases is worse off than in the case of no such
change if the education level of the population is low. If the
average level of education is relatively high, the results show that
also a strong demographic dividend can be reaped from the in-
teraction of more people in working age and those people being
better educated.
These findings also suggest that the widely used hierarchical
conceptualization of the demographic dividend as an opportu-
nity that is opened and triggered by a decline in the youth de-
pendency ratio and which requires investments in education and
health as a second-order additional investment is misleading.
The analysis reveals that the age structural change by itself does
not open any specific opportunity and the improvement of hu-
man capital is the primary and dominant driver of the true
demographic dividend.
The Contribution of Education and Age Structure Changes to
Economic Development: The Cases of South Korea and
Nigeria
To assess quantitatively the relative importance of changes in age
structure and education as determinants of long-term economic
development trends, we employ the estimates of our model to
simulate alternative GDP per capita histories for South Korea
and Nigeria as two prominent examples of economies at very
different stages of their development. In particular, for South
Korea, we aim at measuring the contribution of different de-
mographic changes, employing two scenarios. In scenario 1, we
fix the share of working-age population in the year 1970 and
simulate GDP per capita (using the above model which has been
reestimated to include exclusively statistically significant vari-
ables) and let all other variables in the model vary as observed in
the period 1970–2015. In scenario 2, we obtain GDP per capita
estimates by fixing the human capital variable in 1970 and letting
the rest of the variables change over the period 1970–2015. Fig. 3
presents the results of these two simulations as log-deviations of
the GDP per capita paths implied by the two scenarios compared
with that obtained if age structure and education trends are
allowed to change as they did in the 45 y considered. The sim-
ulation results highlight the quantitative importance of human
capital accumulation as a determinant of GDP per capita trends:
Without the educational improvement that took place in the
country in this period, income per capita in South Korea today
would be approximately one-third of its actual value. The income
per capita loss implied by fixing age structure in 1970, on the
other hand, is extremely small for 2015, and this scenario implies,
for some decades, even higher GDP per capita than in the sce-
nario which incorporates the actual dynamics of all variables.
We also perform GDP per capita simulations for Nigeria, the
most populated country in Africa and an economy whose future
development will be central to global poverty dynamics (30). To
isolate the differential effects that education and age structure
changes may have on economic growth in the country, we cal-
culate counterfactual GDP per capita paths for three different
scenarios. In scenario 1, we simulate an expansion of educational
attainment in the country similar to the one which took place in
South Korea in the period 1970–2015, keeping the age structure
dynamics similar to those which took place in Nigeria. Scenario 2
also assumes age structure changes similar to those that actually
took place in the country, but fixes the educational attainment
level to that in Nigeria in 1970 for the full simulation period.
Scenario 3 imposes both the educational attainment and age
structure changes that took place in South Korea on Nigeria. Fig.
4 presents the simulation results for these scenarios as deviations
from the GDP per capita path implied by the model for the
actual developments in the corresponding variables in Nigeria.
The results of the simulations for Nigeria exemplify the im-
portance of human capital as a catalyst of the effect of age
structure changes on economic growth. The simulation for a
scenario where educational attainment is assumed to expand
rapidly following the path experienced by South Korea combined
with the actual changes in age structure in Nigeria (scenario 1)
results in significantly larger GDP per capita levels by 2000–2015
than given by the actual development. If the Korean education
expansion is furthermore combined with the Korean trend in the
working-age share (scenario 3), then GDP per capita would first
increase less and, after 1995–2000, more than under scenario 1.
This is a consequence of the interaction between age structure
and education: In a low-education context, an increase in the
working-age population leads to a GDP depressing effect while,
in a high-education context (after 1995), it leads to an enhancing
effect. The simulated GDP per capita in 2015 for Nigeria would
be ∼65% higher than the benchmark under scenario 3 and 29%
higher under scenario 1. Scenario 2, where educational attain-
ment is fixed at the level it had in Nigeria in 1970 combined with
the empirical age structure change, suggests a counterfactual
GDP per capita 25% below what has been observed.
Fig. 3. Simulated GDP per capita paths in South Korea by scenario (differ-
ence in log-GDP per capita from model fitted values for changing age
structure and education).
Fig. 4. Simulated GDP per capita paths in Nigeria by scenario (difference in
log-GDP per capita from model fitted values for changing age structure and
education).
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These simulation exercises for South Korea and Nigeria dem-
onstrate that improvement in the educational attainment com-
position of the population is the primary driver and facilitator of
economic growth, with age structure changes playing a secondary
role. Such counterfactual simulations which independently vary
the two different demographic structures have to be interpreted
with caution, however, since, in reality, the two changes are not
independent. Improvements in female education are widely con-
sidered to be a key determinant of declining fertility rates, and
hence an application of the South Korean education expansion to
Nigeria from 1970 onward would have most likely resulted in a
significant fertility decline which also—with some time lag—would
have increased the proportion in working age. However, whether
the fertility decline leading to a changed age structure is due to
exogenous forces (such as family planning programs) or a conse-
quence of improving female education is a separate research
question beyond the scope of this paper and does not affect the
findings presented here. If, indeed, fertility decline had been in-
duced by external forces and this should have an independent
effect on economic growth, then the age structure should have a
significant effect independent of the adult education in the same
year. A more systematic discussion of the causal mechanism in-
volved and the possible quantity−quality trade-offs in determining
the sizes and the education levels of specific cohorts is given in
SI Appendix.
Policy Implications
In this paper, we present scientific evidence that puts into
question the currently dominant rationale for linking de-
mographic trends with economic growth in developing countries.
We show that exogenously induced declines in fertility which
result in a higher proportion of the population of typical working
age bring, by themselves, no economic growth dividend. Actually,
drops in fertility may lead to worsening economic conditions if
they happen in the context of very low education, presumably
with the increasing proportion of young adults with low educa-
tion and less family duties having the potential of causing po-
litical and economic insecurity. A link can possible be drawn to
the extensive literature on the negative trends and security risks
associated with the youth bulge (31), although a study of this
issue goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Our study confirms earlier analyses showing that improve-
ments in the educational attainment structures of populations
are a key driver of economic growth (12, 13, 16). Given that
variations in the educational composition of the population can
also be denoted demographic changes, one can say that invest-
ments in human capital bring the true demographic dividend.
The resulting policy focus on human capital formation is fully
in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and, in
particular, Goals 3 to 5 on health, education and gender equity.
Population growth and age structure are not explicitly mentioned
in the SDGs, but reproductive health is listed as one of the more
specific targets under the health goal. The findings presented
here endorse these global policy priorities. They do not diminish
the importance of reproductive health and rights from a human
rights perspective, but they imply that attempts to justify them in
terms of economic benefits from possibly resulting fertility de-
clines are not substantiated.
The findings do not imply that there should not be any specific
population policies. Quite the opposite, they strongly suggest
that an explicit policy focus on strengthening societies’ human
resources (the number of people by age, gender, education,
health status, and labor force participation) should be a devel-
opment priority. All bigger companies have clear policies for
human resource management. Similarly, population policies
should focus on national human resource management. Also,
given that human capital clearly strengthens societies’ resilience
and adaptive capacity to already unavoidable environmental
changes (32), this suggests that population policies understood in
this way should actually be a priority policy toward sustainable
development in rich and poor countries alike.
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